In the wake of these kinds of events, we are able to band together and eventually return to our normal everyday lives. On several occasions, we have splashed back, or thrown rocks in return--however you want to extend the metaphor--to exact revenge and to try to ensure that the rock throwers will be rendered as small and ineffective as possible. Unfortunately, rocks continue to occasionally land in our pond and we are forced to have the same conversations about what to do over and over.
The hasty reaction to the terrorism of the September 11th attacks, specifically the initialization of two occupation wars, one of which was started without the approval of the United Nations (and therefore illegally in the minds of many) and neither of which were started with any thought about an exit strategy, has left a lasting sour taste in the mouths of liberals. The awful, drawn-out conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the ongoing drone campaigns in Iraq and Pakistan, initially decimated the numbers of our ideological enemies but have ultimately led to a hatred of America and the West held by entire populations, not just the theocratic factions that once oppressed them. For too many in the region, the enemy of the enemy became a friend, and the number of Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Haqqani, and other violent radicals in the region increased in response to liberators becoming invaders and occupiers.
As a result, it is now a common cry from liberal minds that the West has created more terrorism than it has ever eliminated through its repeated forays into the Middle East. This is certainly an arguable case, but the false conclusion that liberals reach for is that no further military intervention in the Middle East should be undertaken because, according to history, it is by definition destined to end in failure.
Their conclusion is strengthened in the wake of terrorist attacks like those that have taken place in Paris. As much as people from all sides of the political spectrum call for a war against Daesh (the derogatory term for ISIS), the strongly liberal-minded are furiously trying to warn us that now more than ever we must understand that hate cannot fight hate, ideology can never be erased, and going to war is just what conservative war-mongers and fear-mongers and other mongers want so they can profit in some way. In essence, we should remain solely on defense.
In a perfect world, spreading messages of peace and love would be enough to convince our ideological enemies to drop their weapons and come on over for a big group hug. Very regrettably, this is not a perfect world and, for all the peace and love a radical might see in someone, he would still kill them if he believes it the right thing to do to be holy and fulfill prophecy. That is why Daesh murders so willingly in and around their territories. No doubt so many of their victims are as good, loving, and honest as we believe ourselves to be, but they are being executed or beheaded and will continue to be. What makes anyone in the West believe that our messages of love and understanding will look any different in the eyes of a zealot who has killed people of the exact same mind, just in a different place?
As a result, it is now a common cry from liberal minds that the West has created more terrorism than it has ever eliminated through its repeated forays into the Middle East. This is certainly an arguable case, but the false conclusion that liberals reach for is that no further military intervention in the Middle East should be undertaken because, according to history, it is by definition destined to end in failure.
Their conclusion is strengthened in the wake of terrorist attacks like those that have taken place in Paris. As much as people from all sides of the political spectrum call for a war against Daesh (the derogatory term for ISIS), the strongly liberal-minded are furiously trying to warn us that now more than ever we must understand that hate cannot fight hate, ideology can never be erased, and going to war is just what conservative war-mongers and fear-mongers and other mongers want so they can profit in some way. In essence, we should remain solely on defense.
In a perfect world, spreading messages of peace and love would be enough to convince our ideological enemies to drop their weapons and come on over for a big group hug. Very regrettably, this is not a perfect world and, for all the peace and love a radical might see in someone, he would still kill them if he believes it the right thing to do to be holy and fulfill prophecy. That is why Daesh murders so willingly in and around their territories. No doubt so many of their victims are as good, loving, and honest as we believe ourselves to be, but they are being executed or beheaded and will continue to be. What makes anyone in the West believe that our messages of love and understanding will look any different in the eyes of a zealot who has killed people of the exact same mind, just in a different place?
If We Do Nothing
Rejection of any type of military intervention in the Middle East, specifically with the aim of combating Daesh and/or supporting its local opponents, would only lead to a death spiral of stability and security in the West, particularly in the EU. To elaborate, Daesh can win against the West in four steps:- First, terrorist attacks kill enemy civilians and undermine the homeland security of their targets.
- Second, refugees flood from combat zones into Europe, overwhelming border security and presenting a humanitarian crisis that divides countries over how to respond.
- Third, the combination of refugees and terror attacks simultaneously bolster the popularity of nationalist parties, as is happening in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in more western and typically leftist countries like France, Germany, Austria, and Denmark. These nationalist parties tend to favor exiting the EU or at least refusing to cooperate with it, contributing to the growing threat of a disassembled and bickering Europe which stands a much smaller threat to Daesh than a united Europe.
- Fourth and finally, rising nationalism espouses intolerance and rejection towards refugees, which if it comes true would push refugees to the outskirts of society, where they will be forced to embrace the outskirts of society. If so, then refugees will have to resort to living poorly and far too often criminally to survive, causing a feedback loop of "they commit crime and do not integrate because nobody hires them and nobody hires them because they commit crime and do not integrate." Being trapped between a hostile society and the war zone of their home, living in homogeneous communities, and dealing with mutual anger and distrust between Europeans and refugees, would serve collectively as the perfect ingredients to foment radicalization and anti-West sentiment.
- As a French former prisoner of Daesh writes, "They will be heartened by every sign of overreaction, of division, of fear, of racism, of xenophobia; they will be drawn to any examples of ugliness on social media. Central to their world view is the belief that communities cannot live together with Muslims, and every day their antennae will be tuned towards finding supporting evidence. The pictures from Germany of people welcoming migrants will have been particularly troubling to them. Cohesion, tolerance – it is not what they want to see." (source)
The first three steps we can already see unfolding before us. The fourth step has not yet happened but history has taught us that it will. Nearly every subjugated or sidelined immigrant group in modern history was contemporaneously associated with crime and poverty. Africans in early America and then Italians and Irish in the early part of the century before Latin Americans since the 1970s, Cold War refugees in the West, Northern Africans in France--all and surely more are examples of how immigrants escaping poor conditions at home become characterized as the bad apples of society, all the more easily if their hosts earn their hate (however, research shows that immigrants are less likely to commit crime than local inhabitants). France especially, with a total population that is 8% Muslim but a prison population that is 70% Muslim, has created in its prisons and ghettos the perfect petri dish in which to grow exactly what plagues it now: Islamic radicalism. In the wake of terror attacks by Islamic fundamentalists, what are the expectations that the French government and its people will try to destroy this inequality and embrace their fellow Frenchman who is a Muslim? No, we can only expect the opposite, much to France's (and our) disadvantage.
In short, it is a nice thought to believe that through patience and understanding, we can defeat ISIS. Unfortunately, refusing to take the fight to Daesh is much, much more likely to result in a completely destabilized, xenophobic Europe overwhelmed by refugees and unable to respond effectively to what would no doubt be an ever-growing, ever-confident mortal threat from the East. The warning signs of this fate are not conjecture at all--they are right in our faces. Instead, we must make the hard choice to go to war.
The Case for War
War should always be a last resort, but against a completely determined enemy already slaughtering, raping, and destroying whole swaths of a continent with the excuse that they are on a mission from God, there is no more room to negotiate. Those who do not just respect the rights of others to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and instead engage in wanton murder and destruction to deny those rights must be stopped by force if persuasion fails. Persuasion has failed and now force must be used.
Still, just as tact and strategy are required in persuasion, now a great level of tact and strategy are required if the West is to engage ISIS in direct combat. A sound plan must be drawn up and clear commitments must be made. All aspects should be covered, room made for contingencies, and expectations set. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan largely failed because of their haphazard, off-the-cuff handling. This war must be fought with clear strategies regarding entry, fulfillment, and exit. Below are my basic suggestions for expectations and commitments that should be set prior to war:
- The war should be led by a coalition, including Russia if possible. The United States's rush into Afghanistan and then Iraq pulled an unwilling NATO into those conflicts and then caused mutual dissatisfaction with how the wars were being handled. In this war, the responsibilities of each country involved should be outlined and agreed upon, then implemented.
- The war's length and depth should be planned, but it should not be so strictly planned that a failure or change in one aspect of the war should cause the entire operation to be disrupted. There should be a willingness among countries to hold a certain amount of reserves in the event that not everything goes according to plan and they are needed. Similarly, no member of the coalition should seek to back out from the war if contingencies occur, thus abandoning the rest of the coalition to make up for their absence.
- The war should not just focus on annihilating Daesh and its similarly-minded counterparts, it should also seek to empower friendly factions in the area. Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian factions which are anti-Daesh, secular, and strongly motivated should be given direct and indirect military support by coalition forces. They should also be given military responsibilities by coalition forces, building familiarity and trust.
- Friendly factions should be given political support in their home countries. While Russia is pro-Assad and the US supports anti-Assad moderates, a deal should be struck for the sake of combating the greater evil. Additionally, the hands-off approach by the US to Karzai's government and ANA/ANP forces, as well as Iraq's forces, has ultimately ended in disappointment. A more forceful stance must be taken to install and support strong friendly factions who can be trusted instead of relying on good faith. Instead of trying to influence from the outside, change should be made from within and the local population should be won over through the efforts of the friendly faction in charge.
- To bolster or even create friendly factions, the West may want to consider the idea of training refugees who are willing and able to return to their homelands and fight. This is a considerably controversial idea, but a volunteer force of willing, able, and motivated displaced persons, which would be heavily vetted and then trained and supplied, could solve a few problems: volunteer forces would be trustworthy, directly commanded, and familiar with the region. They would be highly motivated by fighting for their homes and they would potentially influence other refugees to return home, confident that when their communities are liberated, they will be in the hands of professional and loyal fighters instead of foreign forces which may disappear unpredictably. Additionally, fighters who stand out could be elected or selected to lead in local leadership positions in government and the military.
At home, public security should be increased through police programs aimed at increasing police numbers alongside pushing positive law enforcement culture, strengthening integrity and public trust in police forces troubled by corruption in addition to invoking the image of police as friendly, positive, and professional. Although further security programs might prove useful, their risk of compromising individual liberty and right to privacy is extremely unrecommended given their potential for instigating civil strife and distrust of government. Instead, since these attacks are typically in public spaces and performed openly (as opposed to a hidden bomb detonated discreetly like the Boston marathon bombing), a constantly heavy police presence should minimize if not altogether stop any opportunity to mount an effective attack.
Simultaneously, refugees should be quickly detained in livable conditions and documented as quickly as possible. International communication, ideally handled by one or more special task forces created to handle the crisis, should be able to sort out as fast as possible who is coming to Europe, where they should be placed, and what should be expected of them. All refugees should go through some level of assimilation education like language lessons, basic local law, and basic local customs before being released into society through a tag-and-release or parole-like system which, while arguably inhumane, would allow governments to track integrating refugees and allow refugees to build the trust of their host governments.
Conclusion
The suggestions I have put forth in this post require a lot of hard choices. Some of the suggestions risk moral or humanitarian calamities if not executed with precision and steadfastness. Nonetheless, I believe that these are the ideal choices to make. They are better than the liberal call to inaction, based on a mistrust of war in the Middle East and a focus on defense and a campaign for compassion. They are better than the conservative call for isolationism, xenophobia, and unmitigated, unplanned war. They are, hopefully, a mix of both sides, the best points taken from each, combined to lift us out of the crises that we are facing now and ultimately make the world a better place for all.